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Abstract 
The future membership of CEECs in the eurozone involves the risk of external asymmetric shocks, 
due to too strong a dependence on one sector or one customer country. By defining two indicators 
- sector-based and geographic - of exposure to shocks, taking into account the symmetry of the 
export structures of a candidate state with the EMU and the opening rate of the candidate state, we 
are able to draw up a classification of countries according to the fulfillment of Kenen’s criterion, 
revised and transposed to the geographic variety of exports. The results, compared with those of 
the two countries of the EMU which are most sensitive to sector-based and geographic shocks 
(Finland and Ireland), testify to a generally pronounced exposure to shocks. An inventory of the 
pairs country / branch and country / destination at the origin of shocks with strong macroeconomic 
impact shows that Bulgaria and Slovakia, and even more Estonia and Latvia, are exposed to major 
risks. Thus, these two small economies would be well advised to create a cyclical stabilization 
fund before envisaging joining the EMU. Against the thesis of the endogeneity of the OCAs 
(optimum currency areas), this recommendation remains valid, insofar as the increase in the share 
of intra-industry trade between the EMU and a candidate state does not necessarily entail a 
convergence of multilateral sector-based export structures. 
 
Résumé 
La future adhésion des pays de l’Est à la zone euro met en avant le risque de choc asymétrique 
externe, dû à une trop forte dépendance sur un secteur ou un pays client. Nous construisons deux 
indicateurs – sectoriel et géographique - d’exposition aux chocs, à partir de la symétrie des 
structures d’exportation d’un pays candidat avec l’UEM et du taux d’ouverture du pays candidat. 
Cela nous permet d’établir un classement des pays en fonction de la réalisation du critère de Kenen 
reformulé, et transposé à la diversité géographique des exportations. Les résultats, comparés à ceux 
des deux  pays de l’UEM les plus sensibles aux chocs sectoriel et géographique (la Finlande et 
l’Irlande), témoignent d’une exposition généralement prononcée. Un inventaire des couples 
pays/branche et pays/destination à l’origine des chocs à fort impact macroéconomique montre que 
la Bulgarie et la Slovaquie, et plus encore l’Estonie et la Lettonie, concentrent les risques majeurs. 
Ces deux petites économies auraient donc intérêt à créer des fonds de stabilisation conjoncturels 
avant d’envisager leur adhésion à l’UEM. Contraire à la thèse de l’endogénéité des ZMO (zones 
monétaires optimales), cette recommandation reste valable, dans la mesure où l’augmentation de la 
part du commerce intrabranche entre l’UEM et un pays candidat ne se traduit pas nécessairement 
par une convergence des structures sectorielles multilatérales d’exportation.  
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Introduction 
 
 
The European Union’s (EU) enlargement towards Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) paves the way for their participation in the European Monetary Union (EMU). One 
of the criteria for EU membership is the acceptance of the judicial community framework, 
which will lead them to apply the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht concerning the 
preparation for the EMU. The CEECs’ joining the EMU depends mainly on the fulfillment of 
nominal convergence criteria. But there is no prerequisite on the traditional real criteria 
defining the optimality of a currency area, whether it be criteria of prevention of asymmetric 
shocks (such as sector-based diversification in P. Kenen), or criteria of absorption of these 
shocks (such as labor mobility in R. Mundell). The more recent approaches to the theory of 
optimum currency areas (OCAs), which estimate the symmetry of shocks and the correlation 
of economic cycles between member states of the same monetary union, are not taken into 
account either. 
 
This gap could have serious consequences : in case of an asymmetric shock with strong 
macroeconomic impact, CEECs, once they have become members of the EMU, will no longer 
have the room for maneuver afforded today by the economic policy. It will no longer be 
possible to absorb a eurozone-related asymmetric shock, either by cutting national central 
banks’ prime interest rates, or by depreciating national currencies. As for the budget policy, it 
will be constrained by the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, and in particular by the 
ceiling for public deficit of 3 per cent of GDP, which will limit the action of automatic tax 
stabilizers. Joining the EMU could then mean shock adjustments being made to the detriment 
of employment. It would therefore be necessary to examine if each candidate state forms an 
OCA with the eurozone, so as to assess if, within the frame of the monetary union, they will 
have the means to prevent or to absorb asymmetric shocks, each of these means 
corresponding to the fulfillment of a particular OCA criterion. 
 
However, this approach, which takes into consideration each country and each criterion in 
turn, is not really satisfactory. In practice, none of the criteria can be perfectly fulfilled. And it 
is impossible to define a degree of minimal satisfaction for each of them, beyond which 
joining the monetary union would be desirable (for example, a given figure for the indicator 
of sector-based diversification of exports or of labor mobility). This reflects the non-
operational character of the OCA theory. The best we can do is to observe a tendency towards 
the fulfillment of the criteria, expressing a tendency as regards the sustainability of 
participation in the union. It is, however, appropriate to set up a classification of candidate 
states for a monetary union, according to the degrees of satisfaction of the various conditions 
of optimality. 
 
This paper follows such a method. We propose a classification of the 10 Central and Eastern 
candidate states for the EU and of Turkey. This classification is based on the fulfillment of  
Kenen’s criterion. This single choice enables us to further develop this author’s original 
approach. We will revise the criterion of sector-based diversification of exports, and we 
transpose the method adopted to the geographic variety of foreign sales. In this way, it will be 
possible to estimate the risk of asymmetric external shocks, whether they be sector-based (due 
to strong dependence on one or several products), or geographic (due to strong dependence on 
one or several customer countries). 
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We will begin by defining two indicators of exposure to external asymmetric shocks, by 
balancing two indicators of symmetry (sector-based and geographic) of the sales of the 
candidate state and of the EMU with the candidate state’s ratio of exports to GDP. Both 
indicators are then calculated for the period 1993-2000 and for the 11 countries mentioned, 
following the CHELEM
1
 database. We thus bring out the economies whose sales by branch 
and/or by destination have an asymmetric general profile. The classification established 
enables us to isolate countries that had obviously better wait before integrating the monetary 
union. We will then determine for which products and which particular customers these 
economies are most exposed. Each of these products or customers represents a potential 
source of external asymmetric shock, a measure of the macroeconomic impact of which we 
propose. 
 
Such an approach is original. The symmetry of trade geography within monetary unions is not 
the subject of systematic study, while the asymmetries noticed can be very significant, as 
shown by the Irish case. The symmetry of production structures is most often envisaged from 
the angle of the progression of intra-industry trade, which does not necessarily testify to a 
convergence of multilateral export structures. 
 
Elaboration of indicators and classification of candidate states according to 
their exposure to shocks 
 
From Hirschman’s index to the indicator of exposure to external asymmetric shocks 
 
The theory of optimum currency areas was developed in the 60s, each author putting forward 
a specific criterion of optimality. In « The theory of optimum currency area : an eclectic 
view », P. Kenen (1969) echoes the contributions of R. Mundell (1961) and of R. MacKinnon 
(1963). His idea is that the diversification in production of a member state of a single-
currency group, which is reflected in that of its exports to the whole world, minimizes the 
macroeconomic impact of an external shock. Many sector-based shocks occur, such as shocks 
of external demand, but they only call for minor adjustments. Furthermore, because of the 
presence of a large number of sectors, on average positive shocks compensate for negative 
shocks. Therefore, economies with a multiform structure of production are good candidates 
for monetary unions, whereas economies concentrated on a small number of activities are 
prone to strong macroeconomic disturbances in case of a sector-based shock. 
                                                 
1 CHELEM is a trade database from the CEPII (Centre d’études prospectives et d’informations internationales). 
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 Symmetry of export structures by branch and by destination 
 
A direct application of Kenen’s thesis consists in calculating national indicators of 
multilateral sector-based diversification of exports, following Hirschman’s method
2
. It is 
however partly inadequate. 
 
Comparing the Hirschman indexes of candidate states and of the EMU can be misleading. If 
some national indicators turned out to be close to that of the EMU by showing a low 
concentration, we might conclude that there are no risks of a sector-based asymmetric shock. 
But such a conclusion would be incorrect : a similar measure of diversification for two 
economies can indeed mask asymmetries of the two structures of export by branch. It is thus 
advisable to calculate another indicator, bilateral this time, and which makes it possible to 
estimate, for every candidate state, the symmetry of the structure of its exports with that of the 
EMU. The Finger index meets these expectations (cf. its mode of calculation in box 1). 
 
 
Box 1 The indicator of symmetry of exporting branches 
 
The symmetry indicator S1 of the exporting branches of two countries A and B, or of a 
country A in relation to the group of its partners B (i.e. a candidate state and the EMU in the 
case studied), is calculated as follows. 
 
Let Ai = Xai / Xa. be the sales of country A in products of branch i on its total exports. 
Let Bi = Xbi / Xb. be the sales of country or zone B in products of branch i on its total exports. 
 
                       n 
S1  =  ½     ∑ | Ai - Bi | 
                     i = 1 
 
S1 varies from 0 to 1. If A and B exported the same share (Ai = Bi whatever i) for each branch, 
the sum of the absolute values and thus S1 would equal 0 (perfect symmetry and absence of 
asymmetric branch shocks). If the exports of A (or B) systematically came from a branch 
including no product exported by B (or A), the sum of the absolute values would equal 2 and 
S1 would equal 1 (perfect asymmetry and strong exposure to shocks). 
The indicator S1 (just like the indicator S2 of box 2) is in accordance with J. M. Finger’s 
approach. Finger’s index equals the sums of the minima for A and B of the shares of each 
branch in total exports, which corresponds to (1 – S1). A value of 0 then signals perfect 
asymmetry and a value of 1 indicates perfect symmetry. 
 
Kenen’s analysis is based on the sole diversification of exporting branches. It is nevertheless 
easily transposable to the diversification of foreign markets. Just as an economy strongly 
                                                 
2
 The Hirschman index (H) is equal to the square root of the sum of squares of the shares of all exports 
attributable to every product. It is contained between 0 and 1, from perfect diversification to concentration on a 
single product. 
                                n 
H = [ ∑ (xi)2 ]1/2  
                              i = 1
 
n being the number of export products and xi the share of the exports of product i on its total exports. 
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exposed to a small number of branches is prone to strong macroeconomic disturbances, a 
country which has few trading partners is sensitive to a recession hitting one of them. The 
higher the geographic concentration of exports, the more damaging the fall in a partner’s 
demand. Just like branch diversification, the geographic diversification of exports minimizes 
the adjustments required by this type of shock. In the long run, it also allows a compensation 
of negative shocks by positive shocks. 
 
Hirschman’s method could be used to calculate an indicator of multilateral diversification of 
foreign markets, but with the drawbacks underlined above. A similar result of indicator for an 
Eastern country and the eurozone would not necessarily mean an identical list of export 
destinations, nor an equivalent percentage of sales allotted to each partner. We shall thus use 
an indicator that measures the symmetry of the structures of exports by destination of a 
candidate state and of the EMU (cf. box 2 for its mode of calculation). 
 
Box 2 The indicator of symmetry of exporting destinations 
 
The indicator S2 of geographic symmetry of exports of two countries A and B, or of a country 
A in relation to the group of its partners B (in our case a candidate state and the EMU), is 
calculated according to the same method as the indicator S1 of symmetry of exporting 
branches.  
 
Let Aj = Xaj / Xa. be the exports of country A to country J on its total exports (except exports 
to the partner or the group of partners). 
Let Bj = Xbj / Xb. be the exports of country or zone B to country J on its total exports (except 
exports towards the partner). 
 
 
                      n 
S2  =  ½    ∑ | Aj - Bj | 
                    j = 1 
 
 
S2 varies from 0 to 1. If A and B exported the same share (Aj = Bj whatever j) to every 
destination elsewhere in the world, the sum of the absolute values and thus S2 would equal 0 
(perfect symmetry and absence of geographic asymmetric shocks). If A (or B) systematically 
exported to a destination to which B (or A) did not export, the sum of the absolute values 
would equal 2 and S2 would equal 1 (perfect asymmetry and strong exposure to shocks). 
 
 
Taking into account ratios of exports to GDP 
 
The indicators of a sector-based and geographic symmetry of exports allow a more reliable 
measure of asymmetries between partners than the comparison of Hirschman’s indexes. But if 
we wish to analyze the risk of an external asymmetric shock for a candidate state in relation to 
the EMU, it is necessary to introduce ratios of export to GDP
3
 into the reasoning. Indeed, the 
                                                 
3
 We could consider the difference in the ratios of exports to GDP between a candidate state and the EMU. But 
our objective is to establish a classification of the eleven countries concerned, and the latter is not affected by the 
sole consideration of the candidate state’s ratio of exports to GDP. 
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macroeconomic impact of an external shock depends just as much on the asymmetry of the 
distribution of foreign sales than on the ratio exports / GDP of the economy which is affected. 
A high asymmetry will not be too worrying if it is combined with a low ratio, but it will be 
doubly so should the opposite occur. We thus define two indicators of exposure to external –
 sector-based and geographic – asymmetric shocks, by balancing the two previous indicators 
of symmetry by the candidate state’s ratio of exports to GDP (cf. box 3). 
 
 
Box 3 Indicators of exposure to external asymmetric shocks 
 
The two previous indicators (boxes 1 and 2) give the synthesis of asymmetries existing 
between the export structures, by branch and by destination, of a candidate state and of the 
EMU. To estimate the risk of an external asymmetric shock, it is necessary to balance these 
indicators by the candidate state’s ratio of exports to GDP, because the macroeconomic 
impact of a sector-based or geographic shock is all the greater as the ratio of exports to GDP 
is high. 
 
By taking the ratio exports / GDP in percentage, we obtain the indicators E1 of exposure to 
sector-based external shocks and E2 of exposure to geographic external shocks : 
 
  E1 = 100 . S1 . (Xcw / GDPc ) 
 
  E2 = 100 . S2 . (Xc (w-z) / GDPc ) 
 
Where GDPc is the candidate state’s GDP. 
And where Xcw and Xc(w-z) are respectively the candidate state’s exports to the whole world 
and to the whole world except the eurozone. 
 
Taking into account extra-EMU exports for the calculation of E2 can be justified as follows : 
when one or several member states of the EMU experience a sudden recession leading to a 
drop in their partners’ exports, the asymmetric shock within the monetary union hits the 
former and not the latter, just as the necessity for adjustment is incumbent upon the former 
and not the latter. It is thus advisable to exclude candidate states’ sales to the EMU to 
appreciate their risk of geographic asymmetric shocks. 
 
If we admit theoretical borders from 0 to 100 % for the ratio of exports to GDP, with 
indicators S1 and S2 varying within the interval [0,1], indicators of exposure to shocks vary 
within the interval [ 0,100 ] (from the smallest exposure to the strongest exposure). 
 
 
 
An often pronounced exposure to shocks  
 
Indicators of exposure to external asymmetric shocks depend on the convergence of the 
export structures of the EMU and of candidate states, as well as on the latter’s trade opening. 
Both of these factors are greatly influenced by a series of agreements coinciding with the 
decay of the centralized system of economic planning and with the dismantling of the 
COMECON, which have resulted in a fall in Central and Eastern countries’ trade with the ex-
USSR. These agreements contribute to liberalizing these countries’ foreign trade and to 
developing their exchanges, in particular with the EU : first-generation economic and trade 
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agreements variously concluded from the late 80s onwards, granting by the Union of the 
clause of the most favored nation for tariffs, extension of the SGP community mechanism 
(System of Generalized Preferences), and second-generation agreements signed over the 
period 1991-93. The latter, also known as « European agreements », set up, over a 10-year 
period, bilateral free trade areas for manufactured goods, between the Union and each of its 
future members. Beyond trade transactions, they liberalize the FDIs between partners. 
 
Non-convergent production structures of exports (1993-2000) 
 
The situation is thus propitious for a renovation of industrial fabrics and a redefining of 
specializations thanks to the impetus given by West-European firms, which take an active part 
in privatization programs, create joint ventures with local companies, or integrate them into 
their sales network by transfer of technology. During the 90s, the most dynamic sectors of 
export to the European Union were those for which foreign presence was particularly 
significant (Freudenberg M. and Lemoine F., 1999). We should thus observe, in the middle 
and long term, a movement of trade opening for countries in transition accompanied by a 
convergence of their production structures with the Union. 
 
If the movement of trade opening was confirmed from the period 1993-1996 to the period 
1997-2000, the same is not true of the convergence of production structures with the EMU, 
considered here from the angle of the structure of exports by branch. With the exception of 
Poland (and also of Turkey), the indicators of symmetry of exports by branch stagnated or 
experienced a slight decrease from one period to the next (cf. table 1). Such a result may seem 
surprising, since the integration of Central and Eastern economies within the networks of 
European multinational companies suggests an increase in their intra-industry exchanges with 
the EMU, which could testify to a growing similarity between production structures. Six 
CEECs saw their intra-industry trade increase from the period 1993-1996 to the period 1997-
2000 
4
 (in order of absolute progression of the intra-industry indicator : Rumania, Slovenia, 
the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, and Lithuania
5
). But there is no real contradiction, since 
the indicators do not follow the same logic : bilateral in the case of intra-industry exchanges, 
and multilateral for the symmetry of exports by branch. It simply shows that the convergence 
of bilateral export structures does not necessarily extend to multilateral export structures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 When considering the annual average for the period 1997-2000 as against the annual average for the period 
1993-1996. Calculations of the author based on a Grubel-Lloyd index - trade balance adjusted - and from the 
breaking up into 71 branches of the CHELEM database. The method of calculation and all the results are given 
in appendix. 
 
5 When considering the evolution of the Grubel-Lloyd index – trade balance adjusted – from 1993 to 2000, seven 
CEECs out of ten experienced an increase in the share of intra-industry exchanges with the UEM, Slovakia being 
added to the list of the six countries mentioned. 
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 Table 1 Indicators of exposure to sector-based asymmetric shocks 
 
Classification 
of candidate 
states (1) 
Indicators of the 
symmetry of exports 
by branch 
Ratio of multilateral 
exports to GDP (in %) 
 
Indicators of exposure to 
sector-based shocks (2) 
 
Average 
1993-1996 
Average 
1997-2000 
Average 
1993-1996 
Average 
1997-2000 
Average 
1993-1996 
Average 
1997-2000 
Poland 0.40 0.36 16 17 6.6 6.2 
Turkey 0.54 0.50 12 14 6.3 6.8 
Czech republic 0.28 0.28 35 47 9.7 13.1 
Rumania 0.49 0.54 21 25 10.5 13.4 
Slovenia 0.32 0.32 44 44 14.1 14.3 
Lithuania 0.49 0.51 38 33 18.5 16.6 
Slovakia 0.32 0.33 44 51 14.3 16.7 
Hungary 0.30 0.34 29 50 8.6 17.0 
Bulgaria 0.44 0.47 40 42 17.8 19.6 
Latvia 0.60 0.63 41 45 24.7 28.5 
Estonia 0.48 0.52 36 70 17.3 36.5 
 
(1) From the least to the most exposed country, based on the result of the annual average of the most recent period 
(1997-2000). 
 (2) The indicator of exposure to shocks is limited by the values 0 and 100. It equals the product of the indicator of 
the symmetry of exports by branch, by the ratio of multilateral exports to GDP (expressed in percentage). The 
column’s results give, for each country, the average of the annual indicators for the two periods. They therefore 
slightly differ from those that would result from the product of the values of the 1st and 3rd columns and from the 
product of the values of the 2nd and 4th columns (i.e. the product of the averages for the two periods).  
 
As a general rule, with no improvement of the indicators of symmetry and with a trade 
opening which intensifies, exposure to sector-based shocks becomes more marked from one 
period to the next (cf. table 1). The levels reached show strong disparities, but without the 
traditional cleavage between countries from Central and Balkan Europe. They can be 
compared with the situation of the two member states of the EMU that are considered most 
fragile as regards exposure to sector-based and geographic shocks, that is Finland and Ireland 
(cf. table 3). A majority of CEECs have a degree of exposure which is similar or superior to 
that of Finland, while remaining lower than that of Ireland. 
 
Baltic States and Slovakia : a strong sensitivity to geographic shocks 
 
Unlike the symmetry of exports by branch, the symmetry of exports by destination generally 
improves from one period to the next, Poland excluded (cf. table 2). The ratios of extra-EMU 
exports to GDP do not necessarily go up. In most cases, exposure to shocks does not 
experience significant change. But the levels reached again reflect significant differences, and 
with no possible distinction between Central and Balkan European countries. Furthermore, a 
majority of countries have a pronounced degree of exposure, superior to that of Finland, even 
far superior in the case of Slovakia and of the three Baltic States. These four countries also 
have a degree of exposure which is close to or higher than that of Ireland. They already found 
themselves ranked among the bottom states for sensitivity to sector-based shocks. We shall 
return to this point in our second part when we shall detail the branches and destinations 
concerned by the risks of shocks with strong macroeconomic impact. 
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 Table 2 Indicators of exposure to geographic asymmetric shocks 
 
Classification 
of candidate 
states (1) 
Indicators of the 
symmetry of exports by 
destination 
Ratio of extra-EMU 
exports to GDP (in %) 
(2) 
Indicator of exposure to 
geographic shocks (3) 
 
Average 
1993-1996 
Average 
1997-2000 
Average  
1993-1996 
Average  
1997-2000 
Average  
1993-1996 
Average  
1997-2000 
Bulgaria 0.54 0.53 6 5 3.3 2.7 
Turkey 0.40 0.38 7 8 2.7 3.0 
Poland 0.41 0.46 7 7 2.8 3.3 
Rumania 0.50 0.40 12 11 5.8 4.3 
Hungary 0.43 0.36 11 18 4.8 6.4 
Czech republic 0.56 0.49 17 19 9.3 9.3 
Slovenia 0.56 0.55 16 17 9.1 9.3 
Lithuania 0.63 0.60 26 22 16.7 13.2 
Slovakia 0.76 0.68 27 24 20.5 16 .1 
Latvia 0.58 0.51 27 32 15.5 16.3 
Estonia 0.64 0.57 23 44 14.9 24.8 
 
(1) From the least to the most exposed country, based on the result of the annual average of the most recent period 
(1997-2000). 
(2) Exports to the whole world, eurozone excluded, to GDP, in percentage. 
(3) The indicator of exposure to shocks is limited by the values 0 and 100. It equals the product of the indicator of 
symmetry of exports by destination, by the ratio of extra-EMU exports to GDP (expressed in percentage). The 
column’s results give, for each country, the average of the annual indicators for the two periods. They therefore 
slightly differ from those that would result from the product of the values of the 1st and 3rd columns and from the 
product of the values of the 2nd and 4th columns (i.e. the product of the averages for the two periods).  
 
 
Table 3 Finland’s and Ireland’s indicators of exposure to sector-based and 
geographic shocks 
 
 Indicator of the symmetry of 
exports by branch 
Ratio of multilateral 
exports to GDP (in %) 
Indicator of exposure to 
sector-based shocks (1) 
 
Average 
1993-1996 
Average 
1997-2000 
Average 
1993-1996 
Average 
1997-2000 
Average 
1993-1996 
Average 
1997-2000 
FINLAND 0.45 0.48 30 34 13.5 16.3 
IRELAND 0.52 0.54 60 74 31.7 40.1 
 Indicator of the symmetry of 
the exports by destination 
Ratio of extra-EMU 
exports to GDP (in %) 
Indicator of exposure for 
geographic shocks (2) 
 
Average 
1993-1996 
Average 
1997-2000 
Average 
1993-1996 
Average 
1997-2000 
Average 
1993-1996 
Average 
1997-2000 
FINLAND 0.30 0.31 20 23 6.0 7.1 
IRELAND 0.36 0.34 36 45 13.1 15.6 
(1) See note (2) on table 1. 
(2)  See note (3) on table 2. 
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The measure of the potential impact of asymmetric shocks : what are the 
major risks ?  
 
Both indicators of exposure to shocks used in the previous part take into account all the 
existing asymmetries between a candidate state and the EMU, whatever the size of such 
asymmetries. Their synthetic character does not allow a detailed analysis, branch per branch, 
or destination per destination. We now propose to isolate the branches and destinations for 
which the potential macroeconomic impact of an external asymmetric shock is significant, by 
clarifying at first how to measure the maximal impact of such a shock. 
 
The measure of the maximal macroeconomic impact of a sector-based or geographic 
shock 
 
To measure the macroeconomic impact of an external asymmetric shock, let us suppose the 
extreme case of a shock bringing about, from one year to the next, a total interruption of the 
exports of a candidate state and of the EMU, for a branch or a given destination. In this case, 
both partners undergo losses equivalent to the ratio of foreign sales corresponding to its GDP 
(in percentage). Let us consider a shock affecting the candidate state. The degree of 
asymmetry of the shock is then measurable by the difference between the candidate state’s 
and the EMU’s ratios. This difference represents in percentage of the GDP the effort of 
adjustment that the candidate state has to make in relation to the eurozone. Considering our 
initial supposition, it measures the maximal impact of a shock (see box 4). 
 
Box 4 Maximal impact of a sector-based or geographic asymmetric shock 
 
Export structures differentiated by destination and by branch between each candidate state 
and the eurozone can be at the origin of asymmetric shocks. We propose to estimate their 
potential impact. The following formula allows to measure, in percentage of the GDP, the 
maximal impact (MI) of a sector-based or geographic shock for a given year : 
 
MIczi = ((Xci / GDPc)- (Xzi / GDPz)) . 100 
 
Where : 
 - i represents the branch or the destination which causes a fall in exports. 
 - Xci and Xzi respectively correspond to the exports of the candidate state and of the eurozone 
for branch or destination i. 
- GDPc and GDPz are the respective gross domestic products of the candidate state and of the 
eurozone. 
 
MIczi is the maximal impact of an asymmetric shock relative to branch or destination i. As we 
consider the shocks affecting a candidate state with regard to the single currency zone, we 
obtain a result in percentage of the GDP for the candidate state, which represents the maximal 
effort of adjustment to be made in case of a shock relative to branch or destination i. The 
shocks that have the highest impact are listed in graphs 1 and 2. 
 
The calculation of the maximal impact of a shock is based on the hypothesis of a complete 
interruption of exports by branch or destination, from one year to the next. The results 
obtained are thus only theoretical ceilings, the impact of a shock depending on the proportion 
of exports affected, and this proportion never reaching 100 %. 
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Estonia and Latvia are exposed to major risks 
 
When we make an inventory of the pairs country / branch (graph 1) and country / destination 
(graph 2) which are likely to be at the origin of shocks with strong macroeconomic impact, 
Estonia and Latvia are widely represented. As a general rule, these shocks would be more 
intense than those that would affect Finland but less intense than those that would affect 
Ireland (cf. graph 3). 
 
The shocks would tend to concern traditional branches 
 
A majority of traditional branches with low technological intensity  are concerned by sector-
based shocks, such as the ready-made clothes industry for Bulgaria and Rumania or the iron-
steel industry for Slovakia. Refined oil products represent a risk for the three Baltic States, 
and a particularly important one for Estonia and Latvia. Only two branches connected with 
new technologies appear among the highest potential risks, telecommunication equipment for 
Estonia and computer equipment for Hungary. The dynamism of Estonian exports of 
telephones and telecommunication equipment can largely be accounted for by foreign, and 
notably Finnish, direct investments, which take advantage of differences in wage costs and 
taxation of profits. Foreign investments, which sharply increased towards Hungary in the 
electronic sector, also account for potential shocks on computer products. This situation 
recalls that of Ireland, which was particularly dynamic in the field of electronic FDIs thanks 
to its integration in the community market, and for which the intensity of a shock on computer 
equipment would be three times as high as for Hungary (cf. graph 3).  
 
Graph 1 The greatest potential asymmetric shocks 
Candidate state / Major branch in crisis 
 
           In % of the candidate state’s GDP, annual average for 1996-2000 
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Bulgaria / Non fer. m etal ind.
Bulgaria / Ready-made clothes
Estonia / Télécom. equip.
Estonia / Ref. oil prod.
Estonia / Non-edible farm prod.
Hungary / Com puter equip.Latvia / Ref. oil products
Latvia / Non-edible farm prod.
Lithuania / Ref. oil prod.
Rum ania / Ready-made prod.
Slovakia / Iron and steel
 
 Note : the graph’s results present in percentage of the GDP the measure of the maximal impact 
(cf. box 4) that a candidate state would undergo in case of a crisis affecting one of its dominant 
export branches. Only average annual impacts superior to 3 per cent of the GDP over the period 
1996-2000, with a minimum of 2 per cent of the GDP a year (with the exception of Hungary / 
computer equipment in 1996 and of Estonia / telecommunication equipment in 1996 and 1997), 
have been recorded. 
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Critical destinations mostly concern future members of the EMU  
 
With the exception of Estonia’s dependence on Russia, which incidentally sharply decreased 
in the 90s owing to a reorientation of the exchanges with the West
6
, the destinations implying 
potential asymmetric shocks concern only countries which, in the short or long run, should 
join the EMU. The greatest risks reflect the preservation of intense exchanges between 
Slovakia and the Czech republic, as well as the persistence of trade links between Estonia and 
Sweden, whose multinationals’ subsidiaries largely contribute to bilateral exchanges. 
 
Candidate states which are most sensitive to geographic shocks (that is those appearing on 
graph 2) are all part of the first round of enlargement of 2004. It is likely that their upcoming 
participation in the single market will contribute to diversifying their European partners, by 
leveling the risk of shock. Should the opposite occur, and in the hypothesis of all current and 
future member states of the European Union joining the EMU, the problem will take the form 
of a derived geographic asymmetric shock. The core of the crisis will already be localized 
within the EMU, and it will be first and foremost the affected country’s task to adjust with 
regard to its partners of the eurozone. The extent of the adjustment for the country affected by 
a derived shock, i.e. a drop in exports to the partner hit by the initial shock, will inevitably be 
of a lesser degree.  
 
Derived shocks may also intervene in case of a crisis affecting the current member states of 
the EMU. Neither the method of calculation of the indicators of exposure to geographic 
asymmetric shocks (cf. box 3), nor the research undertaken to discover the greatest potential 
shocks (cf. graph 2), took this point into account. But if we calculate the indicators of 
exposure with the ratio of multilateral exports to GDP instead of the ratio of extra-EMU 
exports to GDP, then the classification of candidate states (cf. table 2) changes noticeably for 
Bulgaria, which drops from first to sixth place, and for Slovenia and the Czech republic, 
which both move two places back. This is due to very strong exposure on the Greek market 
(Bulgaria), the Italian market (Bulgaria and Slovenia) and the German market (the Czech 
republic). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The share of Estonia’s exports to Russia on its total exports gradually decreased from 14 % in 1993 to 3 % in 
2000 (versus 1 % for the EMU). It is moreover difficult to distinguish, in the fall in Estonia’s exports to Russia 
from 1997 to 1998, what was caused by the long-term movement of reorientation of exchanges from what was 
caused by the sharp decline in the Russian GDP (about 5 % in 1998). The drop in Estonian exports to Russia in 
1998 was largely compensated by an increase in its total exports. 
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Graph 2 The greatest potential asymmetric shocks 
Candidate state / Major partner in crisis 
 
In % of the candidate state’s GDP, annual average for 1996-2000 
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   Note : the graph’s results present in percentage of the GDP the measure of the maximal impact 
(cf. box 4) that a candidate state would undergo in case of a crisis affecting a major trade partner. 
Only average annual impacts superior to 2.5 per cent of the GDP over the period 1996-2000, with 
a minimum of  2 per cent of the GDP a year, have been recorded. 
 
 
Graph 3 Finland’s and Ireland’s most intense potential sector-based  
and geographic shocks 
 
In % of the candidate state’s GDP, annual average for 1996-2000 
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Note : for graph 3, the method of graph 1 has been applied to sector-based shocks and that of   
graph 2 for geographic shocks. 
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Conclusion 
 
The results obtained reveal the future EU members’ generally pronounced exposure to 
external asymmetric shocks with the EMU. Half of the candidate states show a degree of 
exposure to sector-based or geographic shocks which is more marked than that of Finland, 
whose export structures are the most concentrated of the eurozone after those of Ireland. 
Allowing for exceptions, critical destinations all concern future EMU members. Poland and 
Turkey rank high for both types of shocks, which is more easily explained by their low trade 
opening than by a convergence of export structures with the EMU. At the bottom of the list, 
Estonia and Latvia present such sensitivity to trade shocks that it should dissuade them from 
hastening to join the EMU, even if they are about to meet the nominal convergence criteria. In 
the absence of a consensus on the creation of a budgetary mechanism of automatic adjustment 
on the level of the EMU (Italianer A. and Vanheukelen M, 1993), these small economies 
should, like Finland, create a national stabilization fund that can be activated in case of a 
shock before joining the EMU. 
 
Such a recommendation goes counter to the thesis of the endogeneity of optimum currency 
areas. Frankel J. and Rose A. K. (1998, 2000) show that using a single currency is at the 
origin of an intensification of trade links between partners, which is itself at the origin of a 
better synchronization of their cycles. It is all the more likely as new exchanges fall within the 
category of intra-industry trade. The very act of creating a monetary union or joining a union 
would thus create the conditions of its own success, by reducing the asymmetry of shocks in 
an endogenous way. For the European Union, this result is qualified but remains valid when 
we take into account the vertical differentiation of intra-industry exchanges, which are liable 
to be at the origin of asymmetric shocks of range (Fontagné L., 1999). This paper has shown 
that the increase in the share of intra-industry trade between a CEEC and the EMU does not 
entail a convergence of their multilateral export structures in every case. The intensification of 
intra-industry trade does not represent a guarantee against external sector-based asymmetric 
shocks. Thus, the idea of an endogenous reduction of the asymmetry of shocks cannot be 
applied in this case. 
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APPENDIX 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF CEECs’ INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE WITH THE EMU 
 
- Grubel-Lloyd index (trade balance adjusted)  - 
 
 
 1993-1996 (annual average) 1997-2000 (annual average)
Latvia 0.27 0.38 
Lithuania 0.31 0.45 
Rumania 0.45 0.47 
Bulgaria 0.55 0.48 
Turkey 0.38 0.49 
Estonia 0.60 0.58 
Slovakia 0.61 0.61 
Hungary 0.72 0.67 
Poland 0.56 0.69 
Slovenia 0.73 0.75 
Czech republic 0.77 0.81 
 Source : author’s calculations based on 71 branches of the CHELEM database. 
 
The calculation of intra-industry exchanges is traditionally based on the following Grubel-
Lloyd index : 
 
  GL  =   1    -    ∑ |Xi - Mi|   , i varying from 1 to n 
                         ∑ (Xi + Mi) 
 
 
Where Xi and Mi respectively stand for the exports and the imports of branch i. 
 
In case of a trade deficit or surplus, a part of the imports or the exports is not compensated by 
reciprocal trade. Yet, in the strict sense, to be able to speak of intra-industry (or inter-industry) 
exchange, it is necessary that similar (or different) products be swapped. The trade balance 
thus distorts the calculation of the shares of intra-industry and inter-industry trade. The share 
of intra-industry trade calculated by GL will be all the lower as the trade balance is high. The 
indicator is thus biased downward. We can correct this bias by calculating the indicator GL’, 
from which the results of the table above are taken : 
 
GL’  =  GL / (1 – k) 
 
With     k   =     |∑ Xi  -  ∑ Mi |  
                           ∑ (Xi + Mi) 
 
If the trade balance (numerator) equals zero, k = 0 and GL = GL’. The higher the trade balance, 
the closer k is to 1 and the more different GL’ is from GL. 
 
 
